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I.

Introduction

A statute may be unclear in a number of different ways: it may be
vague, it may be anachronistic, it may be inconsistent, to name just a few.
Statutes inform individuals of their rights and responsibilities.
Clarity of language is crucial to the transmission of this information.
Nowhere is this more significant than in criminal statutes. In Grayned v.
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City of Rockford,1 the United States Supreme Court said that “[v]ague
laws offend several important values.”2
The Court explained that because it assumed that “man is free to
steer between lawful and unlawful conduct” it is essential that “laws
give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.”3 “Vague laws
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.”4
The Grayned Court further noted that to prevent “arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement . . . laws must provide explicit standards for
those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application.”5
The New Jersey Supreme Court cited the Grayned case in support
of the doctrine that penal statutes must be strictly construed.6 That
doctrine “has at its heart the requirement of due process. No one shall
be punished for a crime unless both that crime and its punishment are
clearly set forth in positive laws.”7 Further, penal statutes “must be
sufficiently definite so that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited.”8
In addition to the failure to provide adequate guidance for ordinary
citizens, unclear laws also cause interpretive difficulties for the courts
bound to apply them. The decisions in those challenging cases are one

*Laura C. Tharney has been a licensed attorney since 1991 and is admitted to practice
in New Jersey and New York; she is a graduate of the Rutgers Law School – Newark.
Samuel M. Silver has been a licensed attorney since 1994 and is admitted to practice in
New Jersey; he is a graduate of the Washington College of Law – American University
and earned an LLM in Advocacy from Stetson University College of Law. Arshiya M.
Fyazi has been a licensed attorney since 2004, and is admitted to practice in New Jersey
and New York; she is a graduate of Brooklyn Law School. Jennifer D. Weitz has been a
licensed attorney since 2013 and is admitted to practice in New Jersey and New York;
she is a graduate of the Rutgers School of Law – Newark. Christopher Mrakovcic has
been a licensed attorney since 2020 and is admitted to practice in New York; he is a
graduate of the Seton Hall University School of Law. Rachael M. Segal has been a licensed
attorney since 2019 and is admitted to practice in New Jersey; she is a graduate of
Rutgers Law School.
1Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
2Id. at 108.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.at 108-09.
6 State v. Valentin, 105 N.J. 14, 17 (1987).
7 Id. at 17-18 (quoting In re Suspension of DeMarco, 83 N.J. 25, 36 (1980)).
8 Id. at 18 (citing Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85, 118 (1983)).
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source of projects for the New Jersey Law Revision Commission (“the
Commission”).
The Commission is charged, by statute, with the responsibility for
conducting a continuous review of the general and permanent statutes
of the State, and the judicial decisions construing those statutes, to
discover defects and anachronisms.9 In addition, the statute calls for the
Commission to prepare and submit to the Legislature bills that are
designed to remedy the defects, reconcile conflicting provisions of the
law, clarify confusing language, and excise redundancies.10 The statute
also directs the Commission to maintain the statutes in a revised,
consolidated, and simplified form.11
In January of 2020, at the end of the second year of New Jersey’s
2018 Legislative session, the New Jersey Legislature passed, and the
Governor signed into law, L.2019, c.474, which changes the law
pertaining to sexual assault.12 A2767 and S2924, the bills giving rise to
the statutory modifications, were based on a Report issued by the
Commission in 2014.13 That Report recommended changes to the
statute concerning sexual assault to better reflect the modern reality of
New Jersey’s sexual offense prosecutions, making the statutory text
consistent with the decisions of New Jersey’s courts, and with the
instructions delivered to jurors during criminal proceedings.14
The changes to the law removed the outdated “physical force”
requirement from the crime of sexual assault, and incorporated
language used by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State in the Interest
of M.T.S.,15 and in State v. Triestman.16 In those cases, the court held that
the element of physical force is satisfied when the defendant engages in
any act of sexual penetration without the affirmative and freely-given
permission of the victim to the specific act of penetration.17 New Jersey
See, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1:12A-8 (2020).
Id.
11 Id.
12 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (2020). New Jersey State Legislature, 2018-2019 Session,
A.B. 2767/S.B. 2924, Senate Law and Public Safety Committee Statement with
Committee
Amendments;
https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2018/Bills/A3000/2767_S2.PDF (last visited March 24,
2021).
13 Id.
14 N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Final Report Relating to Title 2C – Sexual Offenses (Dec.
8, 2014), https://www.njlrc.org/projects/2020/2/5/title-2c-sexualoffenses?rq=title%202c%20-%20sexual%20 (last visited Mar. 21, 2021) [hereinafter
NJLRC, Dec. 2014 Final Report].
15 State in the Interest of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 424-25 (1992).
16 State v. Triestman, 416 N.J. Super. 195, 210 (App. Div. 2010).
17 NJLRC, Dec. 2014 Final Report, supra note 14.
9

10
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jurors are likewise instructed that physical force is an act of sexual
penetration that occurs without a victim’s freely and affirmatively given
permission.18
In addition, the law now incorporates the standard set forth in
State v. Olivio,19 and included in the current jury instructions, that a
person shall be considered to have a mental disease or defect if they are
incapable of understanding or exercising the right to refuse to engage in
sexual conduct.20
The law was also updated to make it gender neutral, make it
consistent with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
phrase “on another” in State v. Rangel,21 and to add the crime of
carjacking as an aggravating offense for sexual assault in response to the
New Jersey Supreme Court’s refusal to deem it so without a specific
statutory basis in State v. Drury.22
That Report is just one example of the Commission’s work in the
criminal law area. The five additional projects discussed in this Article
provide a brief look at New Jersey’s criminal law, and the Commission’s
recent work in the area.

II.

Commission Projects Responding to the Need
for Clarity in the Criminal Law
A. MENS REA FOR DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES

In New Jersey, when a statute does not prescribe a culpable mental
state for the commission of an offense, the mens rea of “knowingly” shall
be applied.23 The authority to incorporate this mental state is found in
New Jersey’s Code of Criminal Justice (“CCJ”), specifically, N.J.S. 2C:2-2,
commonly referred to as the “gap filler” statute.24 The Commission’s
examination of the CCJ confirmed that numerous disorderly persons
offenses do not set forth a requisite mental state, requiring courts to
gap-fill this essential element.25

Id.
State v. Olivio, 123 N.J. 550 (1991).
20 Id.
21 State v. Rangel, 213 N.J. 500 (2013).
22 Id.; State v. Drury, 190 N.J. 197 (2007).
23 N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Final Report Relating to Mens Rea for Disorderly Persons
Offenses (Dec. 20, 2018), www.njlrc.org (last visited March 19, 2021) [hereinafter
NJLRC Dec. 2018 Final Report].
24 Id.
25 Id.
18
19
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In December of 2018, after a review of all the disorderly persons
offenses enumerated within the CCJ, the Commission released a Final
Report recommending inclusion of the appropriate mental element
where applicable.26 The Final Report clarified that where a statute does
not prescribe a culpable mental state for the commission of a specified
disorderly persons offense, pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:2-2 a mens rea of
“knowingly” shall be applied.27 Thus, courts would not have to fill in the
required mental element for disorderly persons offenses lacking explicit
statutory wording, as the Appellate Division did in State v. Bessey,28 the
case that gave rise to this project.
In Bessey, the Appellate Division examined N.J.S. 2C:33-7, which
codifies the disorderly persons offense of obstructing highways and
other public passages.29 The plaintiff, an animal rights advocate, was
distributing leaflets outside an arena in Trenton that was hosting a
circus performance.30 When the plaintiff stepped into a crosswalk to
distribute a pamphlet to a motorist, a police officer admonished her for
what he considered dangerous conduct.31 The plaintiff then crossed the
street, moving to an area with heavy pedestrian and vehicular traffic,
and started distributing the literature there.32 The same police officer
concluded that her activities were contributing to, and possibly
worsening, traffic congestion on that side, and instructed her to move
away from the crosswalk and the sidewalk area between the
crosswalks.33 After a verbal exchange between the two, plaintiff was
arrested and subsequently convicted for violating N.J.S. 2C:33-7b(1).34
New Jersey’s statute regarding the obstruction of highways and
other public passages provides, in relevant part:
a. A person, who having no legal privilege to do so, purposely
or recklessly obstructs any highway or other public passage
whether alone or with others, commits a petty disorderly
persons offense . . .

26 N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Minutes of NJLRC Meeting, Dec. 20, 2018, www.njlrc.org
(last visited Mar. 19, 2021).
27 NJLRC Dec. 2018 Final Report, supra note 23.
28 State v. Bessey, 2014 WL 9928205 (App. Div. 2015).
29 Id. at *1.
30 Id.
31 Id. at *3.
32 Id. at *4.
33 Id. at *5.
34 Bessey, 2014 WL 9928205 at *5.
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b. A person in a gathering commits a petty disorderly persons
offense if he refuses to obey a reasonable official request or
order to move:
(1) To prevent obstruction of a highway or other public
passage; or
(2) To maintain public safety by dispersing those
gathered in dangerous proximity to a fire or other hazard
. . ..35
Affirming the trial court’s ruling, the Appellate Division focused on
the intent required for the offense of “obstruct[ing] highways and other
public passages” since the statute is silent in this regard.36 The court
explained that despite both parties’ argument that “knowingly” is the
correct mens rea, their reliance on the gap filler of N.J.S. 2C:2-2c(3) was
misplaced, as that provision applies only to a crime, and the case at bar
involved a petty disorderly persons offense.37 The court noted that the
terms “offense” and “crime” are used distinctly in N.J.S. 2C:2-2c(3),
indicating that different levels of culpability should be considered based
on the nature of the charge.38
After considering the definition of “refuses” in both its plain and
legal uses, the court concluded that the term “refuses to obey a
reasonable official request or order to move” means an individual who
willfully and knowingly defies a reasonable command from a law
enforcement officer which, in this case, was to prevent obstruction of a
highway or other public passage.39 While the court’s interpretation did
comport with the default standard contained in N.J.S. 2C:2-2c(3), it was
careful to explain that the default only applies to crimes, and cannot be
read into disorderly persons offenses.40
The Commission’s research in this area was intended to clarify the
statute, to avoid the additional legal analysis required of a court in the
absence of a statutory mens rea. The Commission also recognized that
establishing an explicit mens rea could prevent potential
overcriminalization. The problem of overcriminalization, the overuse
or misuse of criminal law, has been recognized across the spectrum of
political and philosophical beliefs.41 Overcriminalization may occur
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-7 (2020).
Bessey, 2014 WL 9928205 at *6.
37 Id. at *7.
38 Id.
39 Id. at *8.
40 Id. at *7.
41 See, e.g., THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, A Judicial Cure for the Disease of
Overcriminalization, https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/judicial-cure-the35
36
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through “(1) untenable offenses; (2) superfluous statutes; (3) doctrines
that overextend culpability; (4) crimes without jurisdictional authority;
(5) grossly disproportionate punishments; and (6) excessive or
pretextual enforcement of petty violations.”42 One way to address
aspects of this problem is to identify criminal laws that lack a mens rea
requirement.43
While overcriminalization is caused in part by the proliferation of
criminal laws enacted by legislatures, courts also play a role when they
choose to construe ambiguous criminal statutes broadly.44 As noted by
the United States Supreme Court, to punish an individual based on acts
alone, without a culpable mental state, is “inconsistent with our
philosophy of criminal law.”45 An explicit mens rea requirement is
therefore “an essential safeguard against unjust convictions and
disproportionate punishment.”46
The Commission’s proposed modification to N.J.S. 2C:2-2(c)(3) is
consistent with the language of the court’s opinion in Bessey, and it
recommends that any reference to a crime should instead refer to an
offense.47 Absent a clear legislative intent to impose strict liability, any
statutory definition of an offense shall be construed based on the
culpability defined in N.J.S. 2C:2-2(b)(2).48 The proposed modifications
were sent to stakeholders and no objection was received to the
proposed statutory changes.49
This project, and others like it, reflects the Commission’s
dedication to improving the form and function of the criminal laws in
the state.
disease-overcriminalization (last visited March 19, 2021). See also SALON, America’s
Over-criminalization Epidemic: How the Prosecution of Atlanta Teachers Exposes a
Broken System,
https://www.salon.com/2015/04/16/americas_over_criminalization_epidemic_how_t
he_prosecution_of_atlanta_teachers_exposes_a_broken_system/ (last visited March 19,
2021).
42 Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 717 (2005).
43 Marc A. Levin, At the State Level, So‐Called Crimes Are Here, There, Everywhere,
CRIM. JUST., Spring 2013, at 4.
44 Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
537, 568 (2012).
45 Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
46 Smith, supra note 44, at 569.
47 NJLRC Dec. 2018 Final Report, supra note 23.
48 The proposed statutory language is as follows: *** A statute defining a crime an
offense, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability plainly
appears, should be construed as defining a crime an offense with the culpability defined
in paragraph b.(2) of this section. This provision applies to offenses crimes defined both
within and outside of this code and to offenses within this code.
49 NJLRC Dec. 2018 Final Report, supra note 23.
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B. “TUMULTUOUS” IN THE DISORDERLY PERSONS CONTEXT
Though the term “tumultuous” is antiquated, it has been employed
in New Jersey’s CCJ without a definition to describe the conduct of a
disorderly person.50 In September of 2018, the Commission considered
the question of what constitutes “tumultuous” behavior pursuant to
New Jersey’s Disorderly Conduct statute, N.J.S. 2C:33-2.51 The absence
of a statutory definition, and the significance of the penalties an
individual may face because of “tumultuous” behavior in public,
necessitated an examination of this statute.52
The Commission released a Final Report proposing several
statutory modifications in December 2019.53 The Commission’s Report
recommends the removal of vague and undefined terms such as
“annoyance” and “tumultuous”; inserts a prohibition on “excessive
noise”; eliminates the unconstitutional “offensive language” subsection;
and adds a definition for the term “public” to bring clarity to the
statute.54
The court’s decision in State v. Finnemen,55 in which the Appellate
Division considered the definition of the words “tumultuous” and
“public” in New Jersey’s Disorderly Conduct statute, N.J.S. 2C:33-2(b),
drew the Commission’s attention to this area of the law.56
In that case, after being asked to leave a local drug store, the
defendant yelled obscenities and made obscene gestures toward the
store employees.57 A police officer observed the defendant’s behavior
and characterized it as “irate and angr[y].”58 The defendant then
entered a nail salon and continued to “yell and cause a scene.”59 The
defendant was apprehended and convicted of disorderly conduct and
resisting arrest by both the municipal court and then by the Law
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-2 (West 2020).
See Memorandum from Wendy Llewellyn, former Legislative Law Clerk on
Meaning of “Tumultuous” and “Public” – N.J.S. 2C:33-2 to the New Jersey Law Revision
Commission (Sept. 10, 2018) (on file with the Commission).
52 See N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, ‘Definition of Tumultuous’, Minutes of NJLRC Meeting,
Sept. 20, 2018, Newark, N.J., www.njlrc.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2021).
53 N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Final Report Regarding the Terms “Public” and
“Tumultuous” as Used in the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice – N.J.S. 2C:33-2 et seq.
(Dec. 19, 2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/596f60f4eb
bd1a322db09e45/ t/5e14ade0 690a736404884e5c/1 578413537950/tumul
tFR121919.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2021) [hereinafter NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report].
54 Id.
55 State v. Finnemen, 2017 WL 4448541 (App. Div. Oct. 6, 2017).
56 Id.; NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report, supra note 53.
57 Finnemen, 2017 WL 4448541 at *1.
58 Id. at *2.
59 Id. at *1-2.
50
51
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Division judge in a trial de novo.60 On appeal, the defendant contended
that, among other issues, his behavior did not rise to the level of
“tumultuous” as set forth in N.J.S. 2C:33-2(a) (1).61
Since “tumultuous” is not defined in the statute, the Appellate
Division consulted various dictionaries, as well as the limited case law
in this area, to determine whether the defendant’s conduct fell within
the ambit of the statute.62 The court also considered whether the
definition of “public,” found in subsection (b) of the statute, applied to
the entire statute.63
Ultimately, the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s
decision and found the defendant’s behavior to be tumultuous.64 It
reasoned that the “defendant’s conduct caused public inconvenience,
annoyance or alarm and constituted overwhelming turbulence or
upheaval.”65 The court further noted that “for the present purposes,”
the word “public,” as defined below subsection b. of N.J.S. 2C:33-2(b),
also applied to subsection a.66
The Commission’s examination of the Model Penal Code (“MPC”),
specifically §250.2, confirmed that New Jersey’s Disorderly Conduct
statute was modeled on the statue set forth in the MPC.67 The New
Jersey statute’s definition of the term “public” is identical to the one
found in the MPC section concerning disorderly conduct, and the
definition is applicable to all the specified behaviors in the disorderly
conduct statute of the MPC.68 A closer examination indicated no
substantive differences, only a structural difference, between MPC §
250.2 and N.J.S. 2C:33-2.69 To address the ambiguity, and following the

Id.
Finnemen, 2017 WL 4448541 at *1-2, *4.
62 Id. at *4-5. The dictionaries were of little assistance to the court as it defined
tumultuous as “marked by tumult”; “tending or disposed or cause to excite a tumult”;
and “marked by violent or overwhelming turbulence or upheaval.” The court examined
the word “tumult” in the context of municipal ordinances affecting the rental of summer
properties and defined it as either an “uproar” or “violent” agitation of mind or feelings.”
In addition, the court found that excessive noise could be an uproar or violent agitation
from the perspective of the victim. See United Prop. Owners Ass’n of Belmar v. Borough
of Belmar, 343 N.J. Super. 1, 67 (App. Div. 2001).
63 Finnemen, 2017 WL4448541 at *4-5.
64 Id. at *5.
65 Id.
66 Id. at *4-5.
67 MODEL PENAL CODE §250.2 Disorderly Conduct (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
68 Id.
69 Id.
60
61
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guidance of the MPC, the Commission proposed structural and language
changes to bring clarity to the statute.70
A survey of each state’s disorderly conduct statute revealed that
twenty-four states use the term “tumultuous” in their statutes, while the
remaining states do not.71 Indiana is currently the only state that
provides a statutory definition for the term “tumultuous.”72 Its statute
defines “tumultuous” as “conduct that results in, or is likely to result in,
serious bodily injury to a person or substantial damage to property.”73
This definition could not be incorporated into New Jersey’s statutes
because the term “serious bodily injury” is already a defined term in
New Jersey’s CCJ, so a different modification was necessary.74
In addition to the issues surrounding “tumultuous,” the “offensive
language” subsection of the New Jersey disorderly conduct statute was
previously determined to be unconstitutional.75 In State in the Interest
of H.D.,76 the Appellate Division considered the case of a juvenile who
appealed an adjudication of juvenile delinquency resulting from his use
of “profane language” toward a police officer.77 The court stated that
the predecessor statute to N.J.S. 2C:33-2(b), N.J.S.A. 2A:170-29(1), was
found to be overbroad, and that both the Supreme Court of the United
States and the New Jersey Supreme Court have “invalidat[ed]
convictions for the public use of offensive language.”78 The Appellate
Division reasoned that the standards in both the statutes were
“practically identical” and that the defect of overbreadth found fatal in
the earlier statute inheres in the latter.79
The Commission’s proposed modifications to N.J.S. 2C:33-2 also
use gender neutral language.80 In addition, the Report proposes striking

NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report, supra note 53.
NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report, supra note 53, at 7.
72 NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report, supra note 53, at 8.
73 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-1-1.
74 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-1(b) where “serious bodily injury” is defined as “bodily
injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member
or organ.”
75 State in the Interest of H.D., 206 N.J. Super. 58 (App. Div. 1985).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 60. N.J.S. 2A:170–29(1) prohibited the public from using “loud and offensive
or profane or indecent language.” Id. (citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); State v. Rosenfeld, 62 N.J. 594 (1973)
(recognizing that the disorderly conduct statute, N.J. STAT ANN. § 2A:170-29(1) may not
be utilized to punish speech which is offensive to the sensibilities of the hearer)).
79 Id. at 61.
80 See NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report, supra note 5353, at 11. See also
70
71
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the term “annoyance” in subsection a. because of the term’s subjective
nature.81 The Commission also proposed eliminating the word
“tumultuous” from a(1) and, instead, adding language concerning
excessive and unreasonable noise to the statute as a(2).82 Further,
subsection b.’s prohibition against offensive language was proposed for
elimination pursuant to the holding of State in the Interest of H.D.83 The
Commission’s suggested structural modifications to the statute include
renumbering subsection a.(2) as a.(3) to accommodate the newlyproposed subsection concerning noise, and the newly-proposed
subsection b. makes clear that “public” applies to the entire section.84
In response to the Commission’s outreach, both the Mercer and
Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Offices offered favorable comments
and support for the proposed modification to the Disorderly Conduct
statute.85 Each acknowledged that clarifying and updating the statute
would be beneficial to remove ambiguity found in the statute’s current
form.86
C. HARASSMENT IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
There is a fine line between constitutionally protected speech and
criminal harassment under New Jersey’s CCJ. Identification of that line

See NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report, supra note 53, at 11.
See NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report, supra note 53, at 2. See also United Prop.
Owners Ass’n of Belmar v. Borough of Belmar, 343 N.J. Super. 1, 67 (App. Div. 2001)
(“Although excessive noise does not qualify as disorderly conduct under N.J.S.A. 2C:332b, unless it consists of coarse or abusive language, it falls within the rubric of
tumultuous.”). See also NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report supra note 53, at 8.
83 See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying discussion.
84 See NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report, supra note 53, at 12.
85 See Letter from Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office *3 to Samuel M. Silver, Deputy
Director, New Jersey Law Revision Commission (Jul. 8, 2019) (on file with the NJLRC).
See also Memorandum from the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office *2 sent via
electronic mail to Samuel M. Silver, Deputy Director, New Jersey Law Revision
Commission (June 28, 2019) (on file with the NJLRC).
86 Id. The other individuals and organizations from whom comments were sought
by the Commission included: the Attorney General of New Jersey; the Appellate Section
of the Attorney General’s Office; the Legislative Liaisons at the Office of the Attorney
General; the New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts; the New Jersey State
Municipal Prosecutor’s Association; each of the twenty-one County Prosecutors; the
New Jersey County Prosecutor’s Association; the New Jersey Office of the Public
Defender; the New Jersey Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; the leadership of the
Criminal Practice Section of the New Jersey State Bar Association; several criminal
defense attorneys; the New Jersey State League of Municipalities; the New Jersey
Association of Counties; the New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police; the New
Jersey Police Traffic Officers Association.
81
82
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was the challenge that faced the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v.
Burkert,87 and the Commission.
In March of 2020, the Commission released a Final Report intended
to clarify the distinction between activities that are considered pure
harassment, and those that serve a legitimate purpose or are
constitutionally protected.88
In Burkert, the relationship of two coworkers, Burkert and Halton,
deteriorated when Burkert read online comments about himself and his
family that had been posted by Halton’s wife.89 In retaliation, Burkert
wrote “degrading and vile dialogue” on copies of the Haltons’ wedding
photograph, which were later found on company property.90 In
response, Halton filed three complaints charging Burkert with
harassment under N.J.S. 2C:33–4(c).91 Burkert was found guilty by a
municipal court judge and a Law Division judge after a trial de novo.92
The Appellate Division vacated the conviction, finding that the defaced
copies of the photographs did not amount to criminal harassment, but
rather were a form of constitutionally protected expression.93
The New Jersey Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
the harassment statute’s subsection (c) and determined that the
phrases “any other course of alarming conduct” and “acts with purpose
to alarm or seriously annoy” should be construed “as repeated
communications directed at a person that reasonably put that person in
fear for his safety or security or that intolerably interfere with that
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy” when applied to cases
based on “pure expressive activity.”94
The court also explained that courts must narrowly construe
statutes that criminalize expressive activity to avoid conflict with the

State v. Burkert, 231 N.J. 257 (2017).
N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Final Report Regarding Harassment N.J.S. 2C:33-4 et seq.
(Mar. 19, 2020), www.njlrc.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2021) [hereinafter NJLRC Mar.
2020 Final Report]; see also N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Draft Tentative Report Regarding
Harassment N.J.S. 2C:33-4 (Apr. 8, 2019), www.njlrc.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2021).
89 Burkert, 231 N.J. at 262-63.
90 Id. at 262-63 (Copies were found “in the employee parking garage and locker
room.”).
91 Id. at 263.
92 Id. (Defendant found guilty on two complaints.).
93 Id. at 269, 283 (agreeing that the defaced photographs were nonetheless
“unprofessional, puerile, and inappropriate for the workplace”).
94 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33–4(c) (2021); Burkert, 231 N.J. at 283-85 (noting that “the
Legislature may decide to amend subsection (c) with other language that conforms to
the requirements of our free-speech clauses”).
87
88
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constitutional right to free speech.95 The New Jersey Supreme Court
found that “the vaguely and broadly worded standard…does not put a
reasonable person on sufficient notice” of speech that is proscribed, and
that its vagueness created undue discretion for “prosecuting
authorities…to bring charges related to permissive expressive
activities.”96
The court said that the statute allows the “conviction of a person
who acts with the purpose to ‘seriously annoy’ another person,” unlike
the corresponding MPC provision, which is premised on “alarming
conduct” and is restricted to conduct that serves “no legitimate
purpose[.]”97 Speech cannot be made criminal “merely because it
annoys, disturbs, or arouses contempt[.]”98 Determining that the
legislative intent was to “address harassment by action rather than
communication,” the court attempted to read the statute as
constitutional in its construction of the terms at issue.99 The court found
that Burkert displayed insensitivity, but “did not engage in repeated
unwanted
communications”
“that
intolerably
interfered
with…[Halton’s]…reasonable expectation of privacy” and therefore the
harassment complaint must fail.100
In addition to the issues raised in Burkert, the court in the earlier
case of State v. Hoffman101 was concerned with the statutory phrase “or
any other manner.”102 The Hoffman court found that this catchall phrase
included only modes of communication that intrude into legitimate
expectations of privacy, which protected the statute from constitutional
attack as overbroad.103
New Jersey courts have emphasized that many protected forms of
speech are intended to annoy, and have used the requirement of a
“purpose to harass” to limit the statutory section.104
95 Burkert, 231 N.J. at 269, 277-78 (The Court also referred to the Model Penal Code
(MPC) and examined how other courts addressed similar statutes to determine the level
of precision required in its analysis.).
96 Id. at 280 (noting “[t]he circularity of the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:33–4, moreover,
does not place limits on the statute”).
97 Id. at 280 (citing N.J.S. 2C:33–4(c)).
98 Id. at 281; see Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987) (citations omitted).
99 Burkert, 231 N.J. at 284-85; see Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 404 (1998) (further
citations omitted); ibid. (Unlike other jurisdictions that struck down overbroad and
vague statutes).
100 Burkert, 231 N.J. at 286-87.
101 See, e.g., State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564 (1997).
102 Id. at 582.
103 Id. at 583.
104 Id. at 583-584 (1997) (“Many forms of speech, oral or written, are intended to
annoy. Letters to the editor of a newspaper are sometimes intended to annoy their
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The Commission also examined the MPC, New Jersey’s CyberHarassment, Stalking, and Assault statutes, and the statutes of other
states, for additional guidance.105 Although no one statute provided a
definitive model that could replace the current New Jersey harassment
statute, several suggested approaches that were helpful.106 This
research formed the basis of the Commission’s consideration of issues
such as: whether “seriously distressed” included both mental and
physical harm; the requisite level of harm; mental and physical “harm”
versus “health”; “distress” versus “alarm”; “distress” versus
“intimidate”; whether “alarm” is synonymous with “threat”; and the fact
that most statutes do not use the terms “alarm” and “mental health[.]”107
In keeping with its practice, the Commission distributed its Report
to, and sought comments from, knowledgeable individuals and
organizations.108 No objections were received in response to the
recommended modifications. 109

subjects. We do not criminalize such speech, even if intended to annoy, because the
manner of speech is non-intrusive.”). See also, R.G. v. R.G., 449 N.J. Super. 208 (App. Div.
2017) (in which defendant sent many coarsely-worded text messages in a dispute
between brothers over the proper care of their parents, but the legitimate purpose for
the messages supported the court’s finding that there was no intent to harass); see also
J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. at 481, 485 (determining that if the defendant’s purpose in taking
photographs of the plaintiff’s house late at night was to collect evidence for a custody
action, he was not guilty of harassment even though the plaintiff was both annoyed and
alarmed); see also State v. L.C., 283 N.J. Super. 441, 448-451 (App. Div. 1995) (court
reversed a guilty conviction where a wife used vulgar language while yelling at her
husband about his girlfriend).
105 NJLRC Mar. 2020 Final Report, supra note 88; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4 cmt.
6; see also Memorandum from John Cannel and Samuel Silver to N.J. Law Revision
Comm’n. (Jun. 10, 2019), www.njlrc.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2021) (including statutes
from sixteen other states) [hereinafter Cannel & Silver Jun. 2019 Memorandum]; see also
N.J.S. 2C:33-4.1 (Crime of Cyber-Harassment), N.J.S. 2C:12-10 (Definitions; Stalking
Designated a Crime; Degrees), and N.J.S. 2C:12-1 (Assault).
106 See Cannel & Silver Jun. 2019 Memorandum, supra note 105. Harassment statutes
in other states frequently serve as the basis for civil orders to protect vulnerable citizens
from domestic violence, which highlights the necessity of having a statute broad enough
to protect domestic violence victims but which is not so vague or overbroad that it
unjustly affects the liberty of persons against whom those claims have been made. See
also 2C:25-19.
107 N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Minutes of NJLRC Meeting, Jun. 20, 2019, www.njlrc.org
(last visited Mar. 19, 2021) [hereinafter Minutes from Jun. 2019 NJLRC Meeting].
108 NJLRC Mar. 2020 Final Report, supra note 88.
109 NJLRC Mar. 2020 Final Report, supra note 88. Individuals and organizations from
whom comments were sought by the Commission included: the New Jersey Association
of Counties; New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police; New Jersey State League of
Municipalities; Office of the Attorney General; Office of the Public Defender; New Jersey
State Municipal Prosecutors’ Association; the Chief of Law Enforcement of Sussex
County; New Jersey Police Traffic Officers Association; and numerous County
Prosecutor’s Offices.
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The Commission’s proposed revisions to the statute begin with the
opening language of the statute, adding language indicating that the
harassment must be “in a manner clearly excessive in light of any
legitimate justification[.]”110 This language was derived from the MPC
to address situations in which a defendant intended to harass the victim,
but for a legitimate purpose.111 The Commission proposed removal of
gendered language throughout. In addition, the proposal replaced the
vague term “harass” with the suggested language “harm or seriously
distress” in order to retain the current purpose requirement112 and
replaced “purpose” with “intent.”113
In subsection (a), the Commission proposed the deletion of the
difficult-to-apply standard “offensively coarse language,” and the
substitution of “manner intended to distress or alarm” for “manner
likely to cause annoyance or alarm.”114
The proposed language in subsection (c) was modeled on the New
Jersey Cyber-Harassment statute.115 The Commission also proposed
that “engages” be replaced with the more specific “[t]hreatens to inflict
injury or physical harm to any person or the property of any person, or
engages in” and that “alarm or seriously annoy such other person” be
replaced with “cause emotional harm or place a person in fear of
physical or emotional harm.”116 The Commission incorporated the
phrase “without legitimate purpose” from the cyber-harassment statute
110 NJLRC Mar. 2020 Final Report, supra note 88; (R.G. v. R.G. (involving a dispute
about care of parents) and State v. Finance American Corp. (regarding debt collection)
may be such situations); Memorandum from John Cannel and Samuel Silver to N.J. Law
Revision Comm’n (Feb. 11, 2019), www.njlrc.org (last visited Mar. 20., 2021) (The first
change reads “and without other legitimate purpose, the person.”) [hereinafter Cannel
& Silver Feb. 2019 Memo].
111 Cannel & Silver Feb. 2019 Memorandum, supra note 110 (Added “and without
other legitimate purpose.”).
112 Cannel & Silver Jun. 2019 Memorandum, supra note 105 (This is more limited
than alternatives such as annoy, bother, or disturb.); see also NJLRC Mar. 2020 Final
Report, supra note 88.
113 N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Minutes of NJLRC Meeting, Mar. 19, 2020, www.njlrc.org
(last visited Mar. 20, 2021) (During the March 2020 meeting, the Commission reviewed
the proposed modifications and discussed whether the word “properly” or “purposely”
should be used in the place of “intent.” The Commission unanimously voted to release
the completed work as a Final Report.).
114 Cannel & Silver Jun. 2019 Memorandum, supra note 105; N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N,
Revised Draft Tentative Report Regarding Harassment N.J.S. 2C:33-4 (Nov. 8, 2019),
www.njlrc.org (last visited Mar. 20, 2021) (Staff also retained language tentatively
approved by the Commission, fixed capitalization, replaced “the person” with “the
individual” and “or any other manner” with “in a manner.”).
115 Adopted by L.2013, c. 272. That statute is a more recent expression of legislative
intent than 2C:33-4.
116 Cannel & Silver Feb. 2019 Memorandum, supra note 110.
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to clarify that the mens rea element of the statute focuses on “core
conduct,” intent, and not speech.117 The proposal changed the
“purpose” requirement from “alarm or seriously annoy” to “harm” to
assure that the activities included in the “other course of alarming
conduct or of repeatedly committed acts” are serious enough to merit
criminal sanctions.118 Finally, the Commission’s proposal streamlined
and restructured the statute to incorporate the proposed revisions.
D. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT BY MEANS OF BODILY FLUIDS
In State v. Majewski,119 the Appellate Division considered whether
N.J.S. 2C:12-13, which prohibits the throwing of bodily fluids at law
enforcement officers, requires the State to prove that the defendant
intended to hit the officer with bodily fluid, or whether intent was
irrelevant under the doctrine of transferred intent.120 The Majewski
court considered a situation in which, during a routine move of an
inmate at the county jail, the defendant spat in the face of one of the
corrections officers.121 The defendant and other inmate witnesses told
the investigating sheriff’s officer that the defendant’s target was an
inmate, not the officer.122 The defendant was charged with “throw[ing]
bodily fluids at [the corrections officer] . . . [while the] said officer . . . was
acting in the performance of her duties while in uniform or exhibiting
evidence of her authority, contrary to N.J.S. 2C:12-13.”123
The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the
statute required the State to prove that the defendant “intended to hit
[the officer] with bodily fluid.”124 The defendant argued that even if it
was an offense, “spitting at someone” should not be elevated into
aggravated assault simply because the fluid accidentally hit an officer.125
The State acknowledged the statute’s ambiguity regarding the
requisite mental state.126 “Nevertheless, it argued the [s]tatute explicitly
incorporated the doctrine of transferred intent because it criminalized
not only the throwing of a bodily fluid at an officer, but also conduct that
‘otherwise purposely subjected [the officer] to contact with a bodily

117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Minutes from Jun. 2019 NJLRC Meeting, supra note 107.
Cannel & Silver Jun. 2019 Memorandum, supra note 105.
State v. Majewski, 450 N.J. Super. 353, 360 (App. Div. 2017).
Id. at 359-60.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 358-359.
Id. at 359.
Id.
Majewski, 450 N.J. Super. at 359.
Id.
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fluid.’”127 The Appellate Division indicated that the statute lacked clarity
regarding “whether the Legislature intended the same culpable mental
state—’purposely’—that expressly applies to ‘subject[ing] [an officer]
to contact with a bodily fluid’” to also apply to ‘“throw[ing] a bodily fluid
at’ such an officer.”128
The Appellate Division determined that for a defendant to be found
guilty of aggravated assault pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:12-13, the State must
prove that: (1) the defendant acted purposely in throwing bodily fluid
or otherwise purposely subjected the victim to contact with a bodily
fluid; (2) the victim was, beyond a reasonable doubt, an employee of one
of the law enforcement agencies set forth in the statute; and, (3) the
victim was, beyond a reasonable doubt, engaged in the performance of
the duties of his or her office at the time of the offense.129 The court held
that the doctrine of transferred intent did not apply because a defendant
does not violate the statute unless the conduct was purposeful and the
result was within his or her design.130
The Commission initiated a project to consider the modification of
N.J.S. 2C:12-13 as a result of the Appellate Division’s decision in State v.
Majewski.131 To ameliorate the statutory ambiguity identified by the
Majewski court, the Commission sought comments from knowledgeable
individuals and organizations and received feedback from the Cape May
County Prosecutor’s Office, the Appellate Section of the Office of the
Public Defender, and the County Prosecutors Association of New
Jersey.132
In addition to amending N.J.S. 2C:12-13 to reflect the purposeful
mental state as discussed in Majewski, the Cape May County
Prosecutor’s Office recommended additional modifications based on
the legislative history of the statute and the mental element included in
other similar statutes.133 Although the legislation at the time of
enactment was specifically intended to protect corrections and parole
Id.
Id. at 361 (citing N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-12).
129 Id. at 361-63 (citing Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Aggravated Assault (Throwing
Bodily Fluid at a Corrections Employee) (N.J.S.A. 2C:12–13),” n.1-2, (June 10, 2002)).
130 Id. at 363.
131 See N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Final Report Regarding the Intent Necessary for the
Aggravated Assault Upon an Officer under N.J.S. 2C:12‐13, at 2 (July 30, 2020),
www.njlrc.org [hereinafter NJLRC July 2020 Final Report]; see also N.J. LAW REVISION
COMM’N, Minutes of NJLRC Meeting, July 30, 2020, at 1, www.njlrc.org (last visited Feb. 21,
2021).
132 NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra note 131.
133 NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra note 131, at 6 n. 30 (citing Letter from Ed
Shim, Senior Assistant Prosecutor, Cape May County, to the New Jersey Law Revision
Commission (July 08, 2020) (on file with the NJLRC)).
127
128
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officers, it has been broadened since enactment so that other officers
may seek its protections.134 The Cape May County Prosecutor’s Office
expressed concern that an assault with bodily fluids from an intoxicated
individual, and a purposeful assault on one officer with incidental
exposure to another might not be covered by the statute under the
holding in Majewski, despite involving the same harm.135 The
Commission’s drafting addressed this concern.
The Office of the Public Defender did not object to modifications to
N.J.S. 2C:12-13 that would make “the requirements of a higher mental
state for all elements more explicit in the statutory text” but did express
concern that the Commission’s proposed modifications “would invite
unwarranted prosecutions and would stigmatize severe respiratory
illness during a pandemic.”136 The Commission’s drafting addressed
this concern as well.
The proposed revisions to the assault statute incorporate a
definition of reasonable fear as suggested by the County Prosecutors
Association of New Jersey (“CPANJ”).137 The revisions also replace the
term “intentionally” in 2C:12-1(a)(4) with the word “purposely” to
“serve the legislature’s intent to promote the clarity of definitions of
specific crimes and dispel obscurity with which the culpability
requirement is often treated when concepts such as ‘general criminal
intent ’. . . ‘presumed intent, ’. . . and the like are used.”138 Finally, the
Commission’s proposal replaces the phrase “placing [protected
individuals] in contact with bodily fluid” with more limited language
requiring that an actor “subject[ ] the individual to contact with bodily
fluid or otherwise hav[e] physical contact with the individual, for no
lawful purpose,” as recommended by the CPANJ.139
During the course of its work in this area, the Commission
considered the impact of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (“COVID-19”)
on its project. COVID-19 is a contagious, and potentially fatal,
respiratory disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus.140 On March 9,
134 A. 1598, 1996 Leg. Sess. (N.J. Feb. 29, 1996) (Statement of Assemblyman Zisa);
NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra note 131, at 6 n. 31-32.
135 NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra note 131 (citing Letter from Ed Shim, Senior
Assistant Prosecutor, Cape May County, to the New Jersey Law Revision Commission, 2–
3 (July 08, 2020) (on file with the NJLRC)).
136 NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra note 131, at 7 (citing Letter from the Joseph
J. Russo, Deputy Public Defender, Appellate Section, to the New Jersey Law Revision
Commission, 1 (July 10, 2020) (on file with the NJLRC)).
137 NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra note 131, at 9.
138 NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra note 131, at 9.
139 NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra note 131, at 9.
140 Exec. Order No. 103, Governor Murphy, (Mar. 9, 2020).
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2020, as part of New Jersey’s coordinated response to address COVID19, Governor Phil Murphy declared a State of Emergency and a Public
Health Emergency.141 The issuance of Executive Order No. 103 declared
that New Jersey was in a state of emergency as a result of the public
health crisis across all 21 counties in New Jersey.142
In March 2020, an individual was charged with a felony for
coughing at a supermarket employee and claiming to be infected with
COVID-19.143 Other individuals, in separate instances, were arrested
and charged with aggravated assault for throwing bodily fluid on police
officers.144 Each of the individuals claimed to be infected with COVID19, and coughed on responding police officers.145
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Commission broadened the
scope of its work to address whether a defendant who deliberately
coughs or sneezes at another person with the intent of causing that
person to believe that they would be infected with a virus can be
charged with aggravated assault or simple assault under N.J.S. 2C:12-13
or N.J.S. 2C:12-1.
The Final Report released on July 30, 2020, recommended
significant amendments to N.J.S. 2C:12-13, including the addition of
language codifying the purposeful mens rea and expanding the list of
protected law enforcement officers to include county corrections
employees, parole officers, members of the Parole Board, and Adult
Diagnostic and Treatment Center employees.146 The Commission also
recommended the addition of a subsection to N.J.S. 2C:12-1 that would
recognize the act of attempting to place someone in reasonable fear of
contracting a contagious disease by purposely coughing, sneezing,

141 Id. See Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Murphy Declares State of
Emergency, Public Health Emergency to Strengthen State Preparedness to Contain the
Spread of COVID-19 (Mar. 09, 2020)
(https://nj.gov/governor/news/news/562020/approved/20200309b.shtml) (last
visited Mar. 20, 2021).
142 Id.
143 New York Times, A Man Coughed on a Wegmans Employee. Now He’s Charged With
a Felony, March 25, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/25/us/coronavirusterrorism-nj.html (last visited March 26, 2021).
144 Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, AG Grewal: If You Threaten a Cop
with COVID-19, You will Face the Maximum Criminal Charges (Apr. 1, 2020)
(https://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases20/pr20200401a.html) (last visited Mar. 19,
2021). The additional charges filed against each of these individuals are more fully
presented in the Attorney General’s Press Release.
145 Id.
146 See generally NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra note 131.
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spitting, or subjecting to contact with bodily fluid, or otherwise having
physical contact with the person, as a simple assault.147
E. KIDNAPPING AND THE UNHARMED RELEASE PROVISION
The “unharmed release” provision of New Jersey’s kidnapping
statute, N.J.S. 2C:13-1(c)(1), does not set forth the type of harm
contemplated by the Legislature to find a defendant guilty of firstdegree kidnapping.148 This provision has been the subject of litigation;
first, in State v. Sherman149 and most recently in State v. Nunez‐
Mosquea.150 After the Appellate Division’s decision in Sherman, the
model jury charge for kidnapping was modified on two separate
occasions to address this issue.151 In December of 2020, the Commission
released a Final Report proposing modifications to the statute to clarify
that the “harm” component of New Jersey’s kidnapping statute should
include physical, emotional, or psychological harm.152
In Nunez‐Mosquea, the court considered a case in which a woman
was kidnapped at gunpoint and forced into a van by the defendant.153
The defendant gagged, kicked, suffocated, and sexually assaulted the
victim.154 After being released, the victim assisted the police in locating
the defendant.155 The defendant was arrested and charged with firstdegree kidnapping.156
The defendant requested a modification of the model jury charge
for first-degree kidnapping at a charge conference.157 The jury, he
argued, should have been advised that “minimal or insubstantial
injuries are insufficient to establish physical harm.”158 The defendant
argued that Sherman acknowledged a difference between emotional and
NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra note 131.
N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Final Report Regarding Proposed Changes to New
Jersey’s Kidnapping Statute to Clarify that the “Harm” Component Includes Physical,
Emotional, or Psychological Harm, N.J.S. 2C:13-1(c)(1) (Dec. 17, 2020), www.njlrc.org
(last visited Mar. 19, 2021) [hereinafter NJLRC Dec. 2020 Final Report].
149 State v. Sherman, 367 N.J. Super. 324 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 180 N.J. 356 (2004)
overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 504 (2005).
150 State v. Nunez‐Mosquea, 2017 WL 3623378 (App. Div. Aug. 24, 2017).
151 NJLRC Dec. 2020 Final Report, supra note 148.
152 See N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, ‘Kidnapping’, Minutes of NJLRC Meeting, Dec. 17,
2020, Newark, New Jersey (held virtually) www.njlrc.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2021);
NJLRC Dec. 2020 Final Report, supra note 148.
153 Nunez‐Mosquea, 2017 WL 3623378 at *1.
154 Id. at *1-2.
155 Id. at *2.
156 Id. at *3.
157 Id. Defendant relied on State v. Sherman, 267 N.J. Super. 324.
158 Id.
147
148
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psychological harm sufficient to satisfy the statute and “the type of harm
That distinction, defendant
inherent in every kidnapping.”159
maintained, should apply to all harm and not merely psychological
harm.160 The court denied the defendant’s request.161
The court convicted the defendant and sentenced him to twentyfive years in state prison for first-degree kidnapping.162 On appeal, he
contended that the trial court “failed to properly instruct the jury on the
harm element of the first-degree kidnapping charge, [thereby depriving
him] of his rights to a fair trial and due process.”163 New Jersey’s
kidnapping statute contains a grading provision that provides that
“kidnapping is a crime of the first degree… [but i]f the actor released the
victim unharmed and in a safe place prior to apprehension, it is a crime
of the second degree.”164
The Appellate Division in Nunez‐Mosquea observed that “[n]o New
Jersey case of which we are aware has ever suggested that there is a
difference between the physical harm sufficient to satisfy the released
unharmed provision of the statute and ‘the type of harm inherent in
every kidnapping.’”165 The court recognized that while “[i]t may be
possible that some types of injury would be of such trifling nature as to
be excluded from the category of injuries which [the Legislature] had in
mind…,”166 those inflicted upon the victim in this case were “plainly not
of that trifling character.”167
The question of harm raised by the defendant in Nunez‐Mosquea
was examined by the court in State v. Sherman fifteen years earlier.168
In Sherman, the defendant abducted a child and held her for ransom for
approximately twenty-four hours.169 During that time, he built her a
“fort” from couch cushions and fed her snacks, before deciding to return
the child to her parents without receiving a ransom.170 The defendant
left the victim at a shopping mall and instructed her “to run to the first

Nunez‐Mosquea, 2017 WL 3623378 at *8.
Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at *12.
163 Id. at *13.
164 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-1(c)(1) (2020) (emphasis added).
165 Nunez‐Mosquea, 2017 WL 3623378 at *19.
166 Id. at *19-20 (citing Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 285 (1945)).
167 Id. at *20.
168 State v. Sherman, 367 N.J. Super. 324 (App. Div.) cert. denied, 180 N.J. 356 (2004),
overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 504 (2005).
169 Id.
170 Id. at 332.
159
160
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adults she saw and tell them the police were looking for her.”171
Although the victim appeared to be in “good condition, with no signs of
physical injury or emotional distress” and said that “the man that took
her treated her nicely,” she was subsequently “diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder.”172
In Sherman, the Appellate Division specifically rejected the
defendant’s argument that the victim’s anxiety, nightmares, and fear
constituted only minimal emotional or psychological harm insufficient
to support the charge of first-degree kidnapping.173 The court held that
“harm in the released unharmed provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)
includes emotional or psychological harm suffered by the victim.”174
The court went on to hold that the State is required to “prove that a
defendant ‘knowingly’ harmed or ‘knowingly’ released the victim in an
unsafe place.”175 The focus of the harm component of the unharmed
release provision in the kidnapping statute is on the “conduct of the
kidnapper during the purposeful removal and holding or confining of
the victim.”176
In 2007, the Model Jury Charge for Kidnapping was amended in
response to Sherman to provide that the State must prove the defendant
“knowingly harmed” or “knowingly did not release” the victim in a safe
place prior to apprehension.177 The Charge clarified that the harm
component can include physical, emotional, or psychological harm.178
In 2014, the Model Jury Charge for kidnapping was revised once
again to provide that: “[i]f the State is contending that the victim
suffered emotional or psychological harm, it must prove that the victim
suffered emotional or psychological harm beyond that inherent in a
kidnapping. That is, the State must prove that the victim suffered
substantial or enduring emotional or psychological harm.”179
As is its practice, the Commission reached out to knowledgeable
individuals and organizations for comments on its work during the

Id. at 333.
Id. at 333-24.
173 Id. at 330-31, 342.
174 Sherman, 367 N.J. Super. at 330.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Nunez‐Mosquea, 2017 WL 3623378 at *6.
178 Id. See Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Kidnapping – Permanent Deprivation of
Custody” (revised Mar 5, 2007).
179 See generally Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Kidnapping” (revised Oct. 6, 2014);
Nunez‐Mosquea, 2017 WL 3623378 at *7 (quoting Model Jury Charge (Criminal),
“Kidnapping” (revised Oct. 6, 2014)).
171
172
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course of this project.180 The Division of Criminal Justice (“DCJ”)
indicated that the proposed revisions captured the guidance proposed
by the case law and modified the statute in a way that will provide
greater comprehension and clarity.181
The mental element, “knowing”, is well established by the existing
case law but is absent from the statute. The DCJ supported the
Commission’s proposal to incorporate the knowledge standard into the
text of the statute.182 The DCJ also concurred with the Commission’s
recommendation to revise and consolidate the “removal” element of the
statute, clarifying the statute without substantially altering its
meaning.183 The language of this proposed modification “will reduce
disputes over textual ambiguities and provided well-defined
parameters for defendants, counsel, jurors and jurists alike.”184
As discussed in Nunez‐Mosquea, proposed modifications to
subsection b.(1) reflect that to demonstrate that a kidnapper is guilty of
first-degree kidnapping, the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the kidnapper “knowingly” caused harm to the victim.185 In
addition, the court held that “disproving unharmed release is a material
element of the crime of first-degree kidnapping, requiring the State to
prove that a defendant ‘knowingly’ harmed or ‘knowingly’ released the
victim in an unsafe place.”186 That language has been incorporated into
the text of the proposed statutory revisions, in subsections b.(1)-(2).187
The Commission also proposed a definition for “harm” in
subsection (f.). The inclusion of this definition “… in the text of the
statute itself is an important expansion that will reduce

NJLRC Dec. 2020 Final Report supra note 148, at 5.
NJLRC Dec. 2020 Final Report, supra note 148, at 5-6; Comments from the Division
of Criminal Justice to Samuel M. Silver, Deputy Director, New Jersey Law Revision
Commission *1 (Nov. 19, 2020) (on file with the NJLRC) [hereinafter DCJ Comments Nov.
2020]. The other individuals and organizations from whom comments were sought
included: the New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts; the New Jersey Municipal
Prosecutor’s Association; Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; the Office of the
Public Defender; the Criminal Law Section of the New Jersey State Bar Association; the
New Jersey County Prosecutor’s Association and each of the County Prosecutors; private
criminal defense attorneys; the New Jersey State League of Municipalities; the New
Jersey Association of Counties; New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police; and the
New Jersey Police Traffic Officers Association.
182 Id. at 6.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Nunez‐Mosquea, 2017 WL 3623378 at *6.
186 Id. (citing State v. Sherman, 367 N.J. Super. 324, 330 (2004)).
187 NJLRC Dec. 2020 Final Report, supra note 148, at 9.
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misinterpretations of an essential element of the offense.”188 Without
the proposed language, “prosecutions with facts similar to Sherman,
where the victim is released prior to apprehension without any physical
injuries, could potentially be overlooked by prosecutors who fail to
comprehend the very serious mental toll inflicted by such incidents.”189
Such a result would trivialize the very real trauma experienced by this
class of victim and undermine public safety.190
In the context of a kidnapping, the victim may experience
psychological or emotional harm, or both.191 The DCJ recommended a
single clause that provides, “… (2) substantial or enduring emotional or
psychological harm, or both.”192 This recommendation is reflected in
the draft statutory language that the Commission proposed to the
Legislature.

III.

Conclusion

The courts agree that no one should “be punished for a crime
unless both that crime and its punishment are clearly set forth in
positive laws.”193 They also agree that penal statutes “must be
sufficiently definite so that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited.”194
The New Jersey Law Revision Commission, in keeping with its
statutory mandate, continues to bring to the attention of the Legislature
areas of New Jersey’s CCJ that could be made clearer, and to support the
Legislature in its efforts to improve New Jersey’s law “in response to the
existing and emerging needs of its citizens.”195

188 NJLRC Dec. 2020 Final Report, supra note 148, at 6-7, 11. DCJ Comments Nov.
2020, supra note 181, at *1. See discussion, supra notes 168-176, of State v. Sherman,
367 N.J. Super. 324 (App. Div. 2004).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. at *2.
192 Id.
193 State v. Valentin, 105 N.J. 14, 17-18 (1987) (quoting In re Suspension of DeMarco,
83 N.J. at 36).
194 Id. (citing Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85, 118 (1983)).
195 N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT (2020) 3, www.njlrc.org
(last visited Mar. 26, 2021).

